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Abstract
Physical adversarial attacks threaten to fool object de-
tection systems, but reproducible research on the real-world
effectiveness of physical patches and how to defend against
them requires a publicly available benchmark dataset. We
present APRICOT, a collection of over 1,000 annotated
photographs of printed adversarial patches in public lo-
cations. The patches target several object categories for
three COCO-trained detection models, and the photos rep-
resent natural variation in position, distance, lighting con-
ditions, and viewing angle. Our analysis suggests that
maintaining adversarial robustness in uncontrolled settings
is highly challenging, but it is still possible to produce
targeted detections under white-box and sometimes black-
box settings. We establish baselines for defending against
adversarial patches through several methods, including a
detector supervised with synthetic data and unsupervised
methods such as kernel density estimation, Bayesian uncer-
tainty, and reconstruction error. Our results suggest that
adversarial patches can be effectively flagged, both in a
high-knowledge, attack-specific scenario, and in an unsu-
pervised setting where patches are detected as anomalies in
natural images. This dataset and the described experiments
provide a benchmark for future research on the effectiveness
of and defenses against physical adversarial objects in the
wild.
1. Introduction
Neural image detection and classification models have
driven important advances in safety-critical contexts such
as medical imaging [13] and autonomous vehicle technol-
ogy [12]. However, deep models have been demonstrated to
be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [3, 32], images designed
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Figure 1: APRICOT images run through FRCNN; only de-
tections caused by the patch are shown. (a) FRCNN ad-
versarial patch targeting apple category. (b) SSD adversar-
ial patch targeting person category. (c) RetinaNet adversar-
ial patch targeting bottle category. (d) FRCNN adversarial
patch targeting suitcase category.
to fool models into making incorrect predictions. The ma-
jority of research in adversarial examples has focused on
digital domain attacks, which directly manipulate the pixels
of an image [15, 23, 6, 25], but it has been shown that it is
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possible to make physical domain attacks in which an ad-
versarial object is manufactured (usually printed) and then
placed in a real-world scene. When photographed, these ad-
versarial objects can trigger model errors in a variety of sys-
tems, including those for classification [17, 10, 4, 1], facial
recognition [29], and object detection [7, 33]. These attacks
are more flexible, as they do not require the attacker to have
direct access to a systems input pixels, and they present a
clear, pressing danger for systems like autonomous vehi-
cles, where the consequences of incorrect judgements can
be dire. In addition, most adversarial defense research has
focused on the task of classification, while for real-world
systems, defenses for deep detection networks are arguably
more important.
Unlike digital attacks, physical adversarial objects must
be designed to be robust against naturally occurring distor-
tions like angle and illumination such that they retain their
adversariality after being printed and photographed under a
variety of conditions. The key to achieving robustness is a
method called Expectation over Transformation [1], which
directly incorporates simulated distortions during the cre-
ation of the adversarial pattern. Without this strategy, adver-
sarial examples typically fail in the real world [21]. For this
reason, physical adversarial examples face a robustness-vs-
blatancy trade-off [7], as robust adversarial textures are typ-
ically more distinctive and visible to the human eye. This is
in contrast to digital attacks, which only need to alter pix-
els by a tiny amount. It is a critical unanswered question,
however, whether making physical adversarial patches ro-
bust also makes them easy to detect by defensive systems.
Securing safety-critical detection systems against adver-
sarial attacks is essential, but conducting research into how
to detect and defeat these attacks is difficult without a
benchmark dataset of adversarial attacks in real-world sit-
uations. We present APRICOT, a dataset of Adversarial
Patches Rearranged In COnText. This dataset consists
of over 1,000 images of printed adversarial patches pho-
tographed in real-world scenes. The patches in APRICOT
are crafted to trigger false positive detections of 10 target
COCO [19] classes in 3 different COCO-trained object de-
tection models [16]. While prior works in physical adver-
sarial examples have included some real-world experiments
in fairly controlled environments [10, 21, 4, 7], our ap-
proach with APRICOT was to use a group of 20 volunteer
photographers to capture images of adversarial patches in
the wild. The dataset incorporates a wide variety of viewing
angles, illuminations, distances-to-camera, and scene com-
positions, which all push the necessary level of patch ro-
bustness further than prior works. To the best of our knowl-
edge, APRICOT is the first publicly released dataset of
physical adversarial patches in context. APRICOT allows
us to perform a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness
of adversarial patches in the wild. We analyze white-box
effectiveness, black-box transferability [25], and the effect
of factors such as size and viewing angle. The APRICOT
dataset will be available for download soon.
Despite the tangible danger posed by physical adversar-
ial examples against object detection networks, there has
been limited research into defensive mechanisms against
them. In addition to the APRICOT dataset, we present base-
line experiments measuring the detectability of adversarial
patches in real-world scenes. We adapt several digital do-
main defenses [22, 11, 27] to the task of defending a Faster-
RCNN [26] from black-box attacks in the real world. We
consider two broad categories of defenses. “Supervised de-
fenses like [22] assume that the defender is aware of the at-
tackers method and can thus generate their own attack sam-
ples and train a defensive mechanism with them. We show
that, given this prior knowledge, it is possible to use images
with synthetically inserted patches to train an adversarial
patch detector with high precision. However, we believe
that such defenses are insufficient in the long run, as they
may not generalize as well to newly emerging attacks. “Un-
supervised defenses like [11, 27] are attack-agnostic, op-
erating without any prior knowledge of attack appearance.
We test several unsupervised defense strategies for both net-
work defense and adversarial patch localization. We hope
that APRICOT will provide a testbed to drive future devel-
opments in defenses for object detection networks.
To summarize, our main contributions are as follows:
1. APRICOT, the first publicly available dataset of phys-
ical adversarial patches in context.
2. Assessment of the robustness of adversarial patches in
the wild, as both white-box and black-box attacks.
3. Several supervised and unsupervised strategies for
flagging adversarial patches in real-world scenes.
In Section 2, we summarize related works in adversarial
examples in both the digital and physical domains. In Sec-
tion 3, we describe the creation of the APRICOT dataset.
In Section 4, we measure the effectiveness of the adversar-
ial patches when placed in real-world scenes. Finally, in
Section 5, we present several defenses designed to flag ad-
versarial patches in the wild.
2. Related Work
Adversarial Examples in Digital Images The phe-
nomenon of adversarial examples in digital images has been
extensively explored in recent years [3, 32, 15, 23, 6]. At-
tack methods tend to follow a common framework of opti-
mizing a perturbation vector that, when added to a digital
image, causes the target classifier to produce an incorrect
answer with high confidence. The most effective adversar-
ial methods make perturbations imperceptible to humans. It
is even possible to create “black-box” attacks without direct
access to the target model by using a surrogate [25].
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Adversarial Examples in the Real World Digital do-
main attacks assume that the attacker is able to manipu-
late the pixels of an image directly. However, some works
have expanded the scope of adversarial examples into the
physical domain [17, 10, 4, 1, 29]. Adversarial examples
in the real world are particularly dangerous for applications
that rely on object detection. [7] developed an optimiza-
tion framework called ShapeShifter that can create adver-
sarial stop signs that will be detected but incorrectly classi-
fied. [33] developed a real-world adversarial patch that can
block person detection. In creating the APRICOT dataset,
we modify ShapeShifter to produce patches that cause de-
tectors to hallucinate objects. Such patches could confuse
machine learning systems and lead them to take pointless
or dangerous actions that would be incomprehensible to a
human observer.
Defending Against Adversarial Examples Most prior
adversary defense literature focuses on digital attacks. In
this work, we adapt several digital domain defenses with a
focus on flagging physical adversarial examples. [22] pro-
posed training a binary classifier to detect adversarial ex-
amples directly. This falls in the category of supervised de-
fenses. They showed that training on one type of attack
can transfer to weaker attacks, but not stronger ones. For
unsupervised defense strategies, several authors have sug-
gested that adversarial examples do not exist on the natural
image manifold. [11] used kernel density estimation (KDE)
to determine whether images are in low density regions of
the training distribution and Bayesian uncertain estimation
with dropout to identify samples in low-confidence regions.
PixelDefend[31] uses a PixelCNN [24] to model the natural
image manifold and back-propagation to remove adversar-
ial perturbations. Defense-GAN[27] uses a generative ad-
versarial network[14] to model the image distribution and
GAN inversion and reconstruction to remove perturbations.
Real-world adversarial objects need to be much more bla-
tant than digital attacks to be robust to natural distortions
[7]. This suggests that physical attacks might be inherently
more detectable, though this question has not yet been an-
swered due to the lack of a dataset like APRICOT.
3. The APRICOT Dataset
APRICOT is a dataset of physical adversarial patches
photographed in real-world scenes. APRICOT contains
1,011 images of 60 unique adversarial patches designed to
attack 3 different COCO-trained detection networks. While
previous works tested physical adversarial objects under
controlled settings, APRICOT provides data to test them in
diverse scenes captured by a variety of photographers. The
dataset includes indoor and outdoor scenes taken at different
times of day featuring various objects in context, with patch
placements that vary in position, scale, rotation and viewing
angle. The intended uses of APRICOT are twofold: firstly,
to assess the risk posed by adversarial patches in real-world
operating conditions, and second, to aid in the creation of
new defenses. Research is stalled by the lack of physical
datasets, which are much more costly to photograph and
annotate than to produce digital samples. We contribute
APRICOT as a benchmark for future works to use in de-
veloping and comparing defensive strategies for object de-
tection networks.
3.1. Generating Adversarial Patches
To generate adversarial examples that are effective
against detectors in the physical domain, we follow the ap-
proach from Chen et al. [7], where the authors optimize
physical adversarial examples constrained to the shape and
color of a stop sign. Since one goal of our dataset is to pro-
mote understanding of real-world adversarial performance
across a variety of target objects and arbitrary locations,
we choose to drop the object-specific mask and color con-
straints. We also optimize them with random COCO images
in the background. This makes our adversarial examples ad-
versarial patches [4] that target detectors and are universal
in that they can be placed in arbitrary locations in the real
world. The key algorithm behind these approaches is Ex-
pectation over Transformation [1], which optimizes a given
patch over many inputs, X , subject to a variety of trans-
formations, T , making the adversarial nature of the patch
robust over the range of transformations. Given a loss func-
tion L and detector f and parameters θ, we optimize to find
a patch pˆ with target category y′ according to:
pˆ = argmin
p∈IRh×w×3
Ex∼X,t∼T [L(fθ(t(x, p)), y′)] (1)
By choosing transformations that model different loca-
tion, scale, and rotation, the optimized patch can remain ef-
fective when printed and placed in the real world, where the
adversary does not have knowledge of the photographer’s
position relative to the patch.
Our attacks target 10 object categories from the COCO
dataset: apple, backpack, bottle, cat, clock, laptop, mi-
crowave, person, potted plant, and suitcase. A patch for
each of the 10 categories using both circle and square masks
is trained with each of 3 COCO-trained detection models:
Faster R-CNN with Resnet-50 [26], SSD with MobileNet
[20], and RetinaNet (SSD with ResNet-50-FPN) [18]. In to-
tal, we create and print 60 patches for collection. Examples
of the trained patches can be seen in Figure 2. Each model
is obtained from the TensorFlow Object Detection Model
Zoo [16], and comes pre-trained on COCO. We adapt the
code provided by Chen et al. [7] in order to accommodate
single shot models.
All patches are optimized using Expectation over Trans-
formation (Equation 1) with the full range of rotations
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Figure 2: Circular patches targeting the Person category for
FRCNN, SSD, and RetinaNet, respectively.
(0◦ − 360◦) and with scale ranging from 5 to 50 percent of
the image. The Adam optimizer [8] is used with a learning
rate of 0.05. The patches are trained for 500 iterations.
Each patch was printed on the high-quality setting of a
Canon PRO-100 series printer. The 20 SSD patches are of
a different resolution (256x256 pixels) than the Faster R-
CNN (FRCNN) and RetinaNet patches (both 600x600 pix-
els). We scaled all patches to the same size physically, as-
suming the effects of pixelation are negligible at this size
given the collection instruments used. We printed using the
Matte Photo Paper setting, printing the entire image on 12
in. x 12 in. non-reflective matte 88lb. 16.5mil (cardstock)
paper. The circle patches have a 10 in. diameter, and square
patches are 10 in. x 10 in.
3.2. Dataset Description
APRICOT comprises 1,011 photos taken by 20 volunteer
photographers on cell phones during Summer 2019. Each
photo is approximately 12 megapixels. Each photographer
was randomly assigned three patches and asked to photo-
graph them in at least five public locations using a vari-
ety of distances, angles, indoor and outdoor settings, and
photo compositions. The dataset contains between 10 and
42 photos of each patch, with a median of 15. Each photo in
the dataset contains exactly one adversarial patch annotated
with a bounding box. The patch generally occupies about
2% of the image pixels.
Previous work finds that viewing angle affects patch ad-
versariality [7]. Because our photos are taken under com-
paratively uncontrolled settings, we were not able to mea-
sure viewing angle at collection time. Instead, we provide
three redundant annotations for each photograph that indi-
cate annotators’ perception of whether the patch is pictured
“Near Head-On” (<5◦), “Angled” (5◦- 45◦), or “Severely
Angled” (>45◦). Annotators’ perceptions are unanimous
for approximately 70% of images. Our experiments use the
mode as the definitive categorization: respectively, 39.1%,
59.5% and 1.5% of images are assigned to each category.
One image with no annotator agreement is excluded from
analyses that include angle. In addition, about 1/4 of the
images are labeled as containing a warped patch; i.e., the
cardstock the patch is printed on is not flat in the image.
Six patches (138 photos) are assigned to the development
set, while the other 54 patches (873 photos) are in the test
set. These partitions are photographed by disjoint sets of
photographers. The COCO 2017 val and test partitions can
be paired with APRICOT for experiments requiring images
without adversaries, resulting in approximately 2.5% adver-
sarial (APRICOT) images per partition. We do not include
a training set for fully-supervised models. Annotations are
distributed in a format compatible with the COCO API.
4. Effectiveness of Adversarial Patches
We present the first systematic analysis of physical ad-
versarial patches in the wild and comparison to digital re-
sults. We evaluate the efficacy of our digital adversarial
patches by running the COCO-trained detectors on COCO
images with the patches inserted (Section 4.1) and on the
APRICOT images of physical patches in the real world
(Section 4.2) and then measuring the effect of the adversar-
ial patch. We define a ‘fooling event’ as a detection that
overlaps a ground truth adversarial bounding box, where
a ‘targeted’ fooling event is classified as the same object
class as the patch’s target. Performance is reported as the
percentage of ground truth adversarial bounding boxes that
produced at least one fooling event.
In order to count only predictions caused by the presence
of an adversarial patch in the image and not true predictions
or non-adversarial model errors, we calculate the intersec-
tion over union (IoU) between predicted bounding boxes
and ground truth patch bounding boxes and only include
predictions with an IoU of at least 0.10. We use a small
IoU for our metric because the patches will sometimes gen-
erate many small, overlapping predictions in the region of
the attack, as can be seen in Figure 1. These predictions
should be preserved because they represent a valid threat to
detectors. Still, we find that performance is only slightly
degraded by increasing the minimum IoU to 0.50, as most
small fooling events are accompanied by larger detections.
Some patches overlap larger objects that also create detec-
tions, like a patch sitting on a bench. To avoid attributing
these to the adversaries, we discard any predicted bounding
boxes that are more than twice as large as the ground truth
box for the patch. This is necessary because APRICOT is
not annotated with COCO object categories.
We report only fooling events with a confidence greater
than 0.30. This threshold was chosen because it is the stan-
dard threshold used by models in the TensorFlow object
detection API model zoo. However, we find that the con-
fidence of fooling event predictions and non-fooling event
predictions follow similar distributions. For this evaluation,
patches are considered small if they take up less than 10% of
the image, medium if they take up between 10% and 20%,
and large if they take up greater than 20%.
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4.1. Digital Performance
Digital evaluation confirms the attacks’ effectiveness be-
fore they are inserted into the unconstrained physical world.
They also serve as an upper threshold of performance before
degradation occurs from real-world effects. Patches have
been digitally inserted into random images from the COCO
dataset at varying image locations, scales (5 − 25% of the
image), and angles of rotation (0◦ − 360◦). Each patch was
inserted into 15 COCO images in this evaluation.
Table 1 shows the performance of the patches when dig-
itally inserted, broken down by the model used to gener-
ate the patch and evaluation model. Results are also bro-
ken down by targeted and untargeted fooling events. The
patches, for the most part, perform much better when the
patch model and evaluation model are the same (white-box
attack) than when they are different (black-box attack [25]).
For targeted fooling events, white-box performance ranges
from 23%− 50%, and black-box performance ranges from
almost completely ineffective in the worst pairings to near-
ing white-box performance in the case of FRCNN patches
on RetinaNet. We find producing untargeted fooling events
to be much easier and see fooling event rates of over 60%
even in the black-box case.
We examine the effect of size and shape of the patches
on fooling event rate in Table 2. The efficacy of adver-
sarial patches increases along with their size in the image
in both the targeted and untargeted cases. Square patches
perform a little better than circle patches, possibly because
patch area was computed using bounding boxes, so circles
are consistently over estimated. When measuring untar-
geted performance, we observe that predicted object cate-
gories are clearly correlated with the patch’s own geome-
try; square patches frequently produce kite predictions and
circular patches produce doughnut predictions. This high-
lights the importance of patch shape and is a factor in the
difficulty of fooling detectors using patches not tailored to
the shape of the targeted category.
4.2. Physical Performance
Table 1 compares physical and digital patch performance
in the white-box and black-box cases. The efficacy of
patches decreases when photographed in the real world. We
observe many of the same trends as in the digital results:
untargeted fooling events are much easier to produce and
certain models are easier to fool in both the white-box and
black-box cases. The correlation between digital and physi-
cal results indicates that an adversary can develop an attack
digitally and have some confidence as to its efficacy in the
real world. However, these results also reveal that fooling
detectors in the wild is challenging, especially given black-
box knowledge.
As in the digital evaluation, the physical performance of
the patches is analysed with respect to several patch charac-
teristics: shape, size, and, additionally, angle to the camera.
Comparison to the digital results can be found in Table 2.
Again, larger patches have a higher fooling rate for all mod-
els in targeted and untargeted cases. Circular patches appear
to be more effective on FRCNN and RetinaNet, but square
patches are more effective on SSD. As in the digital evalu-
ation, patch geometry has an effect on untargeted category
predictions. Circular patches favor kite and umbrella, while
also producing frisbee, sports ball, and doughnut. In con-
trast, square patches favor categories such as TV, handbag,
book, and kite. We hypothesize kite is a common prediction
due to sharing bright colors with the patches. As angle be-
comes more extreme, targeted performance decreases. Note
that shear transformations were not used during patch train-
ing. Interestingly, in the untargeted case, head-on and an-
gled patches perform roughly the same, but severely angled
patches perform best by a large margin. Untargeted predic-
tions for severely angled patches favor categories such as
kite and umbrella, and also include surfboard and laptop.
Some of the patches included in APRICOT contain re-
gions that closely resemble the target object class. For ex-
ample, apple-like patterns can be seen in the patch in Figure
1a. This phenomenon was also observed by [7]. This result
is not entirely surprising, as the optimization framework of
[7] resembles [30] which instead used gradient ascent as a
tool for network explanation and object class visualization.
Even though some patches resemble natural objects, they
may still be considered adversarial if they possess an unnat-
ural hyper-objectness characteristic. The work of [4] was
able to produce adversarial patches that influence a classi-
fier’s output more strongly than a genuine object instance.
This shows that adversarial patterns can manipulate a net-
work’s internal representations in an unnatural way to draw
more attention than a natural object. This phenomenon
could explain why the patches in APRICOT trigger so many
untargeted detections even when severely angled.
5. Flagging Adversarial Patches
Detection systems that can accurately flag adversaries
could neutralize their risk by identifying and filtering ma-
licious results. There are multiple ways to formulate the
task of flagging adversaries. One could train a detector to
directly output predictions for patch locations. Or one could
apply defensive techniques to a detection network’s outputs
to identify if one of its predictions was caused by an adver-
sary. Or one could ignore the detector and directly assess
image regions to predict whether they contain an adversar-
ial patch. We present baseline experiments to address each
of these strategies.
We consider both supervised and unsupervised defenses.
In this context, “supervised defense” means that we assume
the defender has some knowledge of the attacker’s algo-
rithm and thus can sample their own patches from the same
5
Evaluation Models
Digital Physical
FRCNN SSD RetinaNet FRCNN SSD RetinaNet
Pa
tc
h
M
od
el
s
FRCNN
(344)
Targeted 0.50 0.04 0.37 0.17 0.0 0.05
Untargeted 0.89 0.64 0.84 0.43 0.15 0.34
SSD
(331)
Targeted 0.08 0.23 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.04
Untargeted 0.71 0.70 0.67 0.39 0.20 0.30
RetinaNet
(336)
Targeted 0.14 0.01 0.39 0.01 0.0 0.03
Untargeted 0.72 0.62 0.78 0.33 0.15 0.29
All
(1,011)
Targeted 0.24 0.09 0.27 0.11 0.02 0.04
Untargeted 0.77 0.65 0.76 0.38 0.17 0.31
Table 1: Performance of digital and physical patches @ 0.3 confidence and 0.10 IoU
Digital Physical
Size Shape Size Shape Angle
Small Medium Large Circle Square Small Medium Large Circle Square Head-On Angled Severe
FRCNN Targeted 0.07 0.64 0.83 0.47 0.53 0.15 1.0 1.0 0.23 0.12 0.21 0.16 0.0Untargeted 0.80 0.92 0.98 0.84 0.95 0.41 1.0 1.0 0.59 0.26 0.42 0.42 0.78
SSD Targeted 0.03 0.22 0.51 0.20 0.25 0.01 0.41 0.67 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.0Untargeted 0.53 0.62 0.92 0.70 0.740 0.14 0.63 1.0 0.14 0.25 0.20 0.19 1.0
RetinaNet Targeted 0.05 0.48 0.60 0.35 0.39 0.01 0.38 0.0 0.06 0.0 0.02 0.03 0.0Untargeted 0.61 0.77 0.94 0.70 0.82 0.27 0.51 1.0 0.37 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.40
Table 2: White-box performance of digital and physical patches broken down by size, shape, and angle
or similar distribution and use them to train a defensive
mechanism. In the digital defense domain, this is analogous
to [22], however it has not yet been studied if the textures
of robust physical adversarial patches can be easily detected
this way. Even if such a defense works, it may not be suffi-
cient if it fails to generalize to new attack strategies, as was
observed in [22]. In contrast, “unsupervised defenses” have
no prior knowledge of the attack strategy, and instead must
learn to identify adversarial anomalies after training on only
normal data. This is clearly more challenging, and we be-
lieve it presents a more realistic defense scenario as new
attacks are always being developed. These approaches are
completely attack-agnostic but may simply expose anoma-
lies in the data without regard for adversariality. Results are
reported on the APRICOT test partition.
5.1. Detecting Adversarial Patches using Synthetic
Supervision
We train a Faster R-CNN [26] object detection network
to detect adversarial patches using a synthetic dataset of
patches digitally overlaid on the COCO 2017 training set.
APRICOT does not contain a training partition, and the cost
of physical data collection makes it impractical to collect
an appropriately large dataset for fully-supervised adver-
sary detector training. Instead we create several synthetic
Flying Patch Datasets (named in homage to [9]) by over-
laying patches of several shapes in random positions, sizes,
and angles on natural images, similar to the method used
in our digital performance analysis. Our adversarial Flying
Patch Datasets also use the method of [7] to create patches.
Under this framework, patches have a confidence parame-
ter which limits their intensity through L2 regularization.
We train models on two datasets, one with a range of confi-
dence settings similar to [7], and one with only high confi-
dence patches with the L2 regularization disabled. A dataset
of Gaussian noise patches is used as a control to examine
whether the models learn features of the attack patterns or
more superficial features such as shape and color. For each
flying patch collection, two models are trained. The joint
variant detects both patches and COCO objects, while patch
only models detect only adversarial patches.
Our patch detector models are fine-tuned from a pub-
licly available COCO detection model, which is the same
model used in [7]. This model is different from any used
to create patches in APRICOT, so all attacks in APRICOT
would be considered as black-box attacks. Table 3 reports
patch detection performance as Average Precision (AP) and
Average Recall (AR). We report results under the default
settings of the COCO API [19]: maximum detections 100
and IoU threshold ranging from 0.5 to 0.95. In practice, if
an automated system is able to correctly detect a sub-region
of an adversarial patch, this detection should be sufficient to
alert the system to the presence of the patch. For this rea-
son, we also report AP and AR under a more lenient IoU
threshold of 0.5. We also provide a breakdown of recall by
target model for the APRICOT patches. Figure 3 visualizes
precision and recall with a 0.5 IoU threshold and max 100
detections.
We find that synthetic data is sufficient to train a high-
performing adversarial patch detector for exemplars in the
physical world. For all training configurations, performance
is significantly improved by jointly training to detect both
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Figure 3: Precision-Recall curves on APRICOT for models
trained on synthetic flying patch images
patches and normal objects. This suggests that modeling
normal objects reduces false positives for adversaries. The
best performing model is the one trained on high confidence
adversarial patches; however, under a lenient IoU thresh-
old, the performance difference between the jointly trained
models becomes much less significant. This suggests that
knowledge of patch shape, color, and texture intensity may
provide enough cues to detect adversarial patches. Error
analysis of high-scoring false positives in APRICOT and
COCO reveals primarily colorful, high-texture objects.
While these supervised models achieve high average pre-
cision, there is a risk they will fail to generalize to new
attacks like in [22]. This motivates the need for attack-
agnostic unsupervised defenses like [31, 27]. In addition,
clever attackers could likely evade detection with white-box
access to the patch detector, or by using regularizations that
create patches closer to the color and texture distributions
of natural scenes.
5.2. Determining if a Detection is Adversarial using
Uncertainty and Density
We adapt the approaches of [11] to determine whether
we can discriminate detections produced by adversarial
patches from normal predictions made by an object detec-
tion model. This method is a self-defense for the object de-
tection model and does not address adversaries that fail to
produce false positives. These approaches examine all pre-
dictions made by the same black-box model as Section 5.1
with >0.3 confidence, resulting in 273 untargeted fooling
events out of 4428 detections in APRICOT’s test partition.
Figure 4 illustrates how embeddings and uncertainty are
extracted for the Faster R-CNN model. The density ap-
proach learns a Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) model
for each output class. In this case, we learn a KDE over
the final latent representation passed to the detector’s ob-
ject classifier, for all detections in COCO val 2017 with at
least 0.3 confidence. The embedding for each detection in
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Figure 4: Adversarial detection strategies of [11] modified
to work with Faster R-CNN. (a) shows a standard Faster
R-CNN and the feature layer used for KDE. (b) shows a
modified version with an added dropout layer for Bayesian
uncertainty estimation. Bounding box regression outputs
are not shown.
APRICOT is scored with respect to the detected class.
The Bayesian uncertainty approach of [11] is considered
to be more robust to adversarial circumvention [5]. Our
Bayesian uncertainty approach is adapted by applying 0.5
dropout to the same Faster R-CNN layer at inference time
and measuring variance in resulting object category pre-
dictions. It would not be possible to add dropout before
the ROI pooling step, as each random trial would alter the
region proposals themselves. Performing dropout at only
the second to last layer is also computationally efficient, as
added random trials incur minimal cost. Scores from these
two methods are then used as features in a logistic regres-
sion learned from the APRICOT dev set, requiring a small
amount of supervision. Note that the individual metrics re-
quire no supervision.
Figure 5 shows Receiver Operating Characteristics for
these three approaches under a low-information scenario
where a single threshold is set for all object classes. All
three approaches are effective for this task. There is insuf-
ficient data to set individual thresholds per detected class,
as would be most appropriate for the KDE models; only
four object classes have at least 10 fooling events under
this model. Many fooling events do not produce the tar-
geted class prediction; this suggests that uncertainty is par-
ticularly effective because these detections lie near deci-
sion boundaries. The additional supervision required to pro-
duce the combined model is only marginally beneficial over
uncertainty alone. These results are confounded by non-
adversarial false positives or unlikely exemplars of COCO
categories. More investigation is needed to determine if
there is a difference in how true and false positives are
scored in these analyses.
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IoU0.5:0.95 IoU0.5
Objective Training Patches AP AR AP AR ARfrcnn ARret ARssd
Joint
Adv. High Conf. 0.686 0.757 0.943 0.981 1.000 0.941 1.000
Adversarial 0.670 0.749 0.937 0.976 0.983 0.944 1.000
Gaussian 0.635 0.714 0.936 0.979 0.987 0.958 0.993
Patch Only
Adv. High Conf. 0.540 0.655 0.739 0.885 0.893 0.785 0.979
Adversarial 0.447 0.588 0.615 0.805 0.759 0.691 0.969
Gaussian 0.329 0.500 0.478 0.742 0.696 0.562 0.872
Table 3: Performance on APRICOT of detector models trained on synthetic flying patch images
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Figure 5: Receiver operating characteristics of KDE and
Bayesian uncertainty for finding adversial detections
5.3. Localizing Adversarial Regions with Density
and Reconstruction
Experiments using autoencoders localize anomalous re-
gions without regard for any attack strategy or target model.
These tests are conducted on (32,32) windows of images,
where a window is considered adversarial if at least half of
the pixels are contained in an APRICOT bounding box. We
model natural images with the ACAI autoencoder described
in [2], trained on windows of the images from COCO’s
2017 train partition. Before constructing the windows, all
images are resized to (600,600).
The density approach is further adapted to learn a one
class model over embeddings of the non-adversarial data
in the COCO 2017 validation partition. A Gaussian Mix-
ture Model is employed on the intuition that since the em-
beddings are not separated by class, they will be multi-
modal. Five components were chosen empirically. Each
image window is represented by mean-pooling the spatially
invariant dimensions of the autoencoder bottleneck.
A previous work [28] used GAN inversion and recon-
struction error as a tool for anomaly detection in medical
imagery. In the context of APRICOT, adversarial patches
may be detectable as anomalies. Another work [27] used
GANs trained on normal data as a tool to remove adver-
sarial perturbations from digital attacks. However, both of
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Figure 6: Performance of autoencoder-based methods for
localizing adversary-containing 32x32 image regions
these GAN-based reconstruction methods rely on compu-
tationally expensive and non-deterministic iterative back-
propagration to recover the latent space vector and recon-
struct the image. We reconstruct each window instead using
the autoencoder and measure the L2 distance of the recon-
struction from the original.
As shown in Figure 6, the density-based approach has
weak predictive power, while reconstruction error seems
to effectively discriminate adversarial windows. High-
frequency natural textures like foliage generate a high re-
construction error, producing false positives. These differ-
ences in performance suggest that the discriminative power
of the autoencoder doesn’t come from the information en-
coded in the latent space, but rather from the information
lost during encoding and decoding.
6. Conclusion
Research into the effectiveness and detectability of ad-
versarial objects in the wild is limited by the absence of la-
beled datasets of such objects in the real world. We provide
the first publicly available dataset of physical adversarial
patches in a variety of real-world settings. Annotations of
the patches’ locations, attacked model, warping, shape, and
angle to the camera are included to allow investigation into
the effects of these attributes on the patches’ adversariality.
Our analysis reveals that photographed physical patches
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in the wild can fool both white-box and in some cases black-
box object detection models. Benchmark flagging experi-
ments establish that adversarial patches can be flagged both
with and without prior knowledge of the attacks. APRICOT
aims to drive future research on the effect of real-world con-
ditions on the effectiveness and detectability of adversarial
patches, and furthermore to aid in development of defenses
for object detection models against physical attacks.
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Figure 7: Sample images from the APRICOT dataset. Images have been downsampled to reduce file size.
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Figure 8: Sample images from the APRICOT dataset
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Figure 9: Sample images from the APRICOT dataset
13
Figure 10: Sample images from the APRICOT dataset
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Figure 11: Sample of “flying patch” images with digi-
tal patches superimposed over COCO images, which were
used to train adversarial patch detectors
Figure 12: Sample of high-scoring false positive patch de-
tections in the COCO 2017 test set as produced by the best-
performing model trained on flying patch images
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